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PURGATORY AND THE 
DILEMMA OF SANCTIFICATION
Justin D. Barnard
Christian Protestants typically affirm both the essential moral perfection of 
heaven and the sufficiency of saving faith. Yet these two commitments gener­
ate an apparently self-destructive dilem m a-one I call the dilemma o f sancti­
fication. The prima facie puzzle can be resolved in at least three ways. In this 
paper, I articulate the dilemma o f sanctification in some detail and offer an ar­
gument against a widely-held Protestant solution I call provisionism. This 
constitutes indirect support for the solution I find most promising, namely, 
a doctrine of purgatory. I close by sketching a model of purgatory consistent 
with Protestant soteriology.
§1. Introduction
Philosophical arguments in defense of a doctrine of purgatory are scant.1 
Among Protestant Christians, this fact is easily explained by its nearly 
universal rejection. For Protestant Christians within the Reformation tra­
dition, for whom the mantra sola Scriptura is a virtual Shibboleth, the doc­
trine of purgatory is typically included among a litany of Roman Catholic 
teachings for which there is insufficient Biblical warrant.2 According to ar­
ticle XXII (Of Purgatory) of the Anglican Thirty-nine Articles of Religion, 
the "Romish Doctrine" of purgatory "is a fond thing, vainly invented, 
and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to 
the Word of God." Somewhat more colorfully, Protestant reformer John 
Calvin called the doctrine of purgatory a "deadly device of Satan" and 
a "horrid blasphemy against Christ." On the other hand, in his Letters to 
Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer, C. S. Lewis suggests:
Our souls demand Purgatory, don't they? Would it not break the heart 
if God said to us, "It is true, my son, that your breath smells and 
your rags drip with mud and slime, but we are charitable here and 
no one will upbraid you with these things, nor draw away from you. 
Enter into the joy"? Should we not reply, "With submission, sir, and 
if there is no objection, I'd rather be cleaned first." "It may hurt, you 
know "-"E ven  so, sir."3
More recently, Jerry Walls has argued that the doctrine of purgatory is 
"plausible . . . for Protestants. For those who take freedom seriously and
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believe that transformation is the heart of what salvation is all about, it 
seems to be a fully natural doctrinal development."4
In this paper, I hope to show that the conviction shared by Christian 
philosophers, such as Lewis and Walls, regarding the appeal of purgatory 
is worth further exploration. In the spirit of Walls's proposal, I will argue 
that a doctrine of purgatory is useful for Protestant Christians who take 
seriously sanctification as a process. However, my own project diverges 
from Walls's treatment in a few important respects. First, I will neither ar­
gue nor assume that "salvation is essentially a matter of transformation"5 
per se. Rather, my project aims to speak not only to those for whom salva­
tion is fundamentally transformative, but also to those for whom salvation 
is principally a matter of forensic or legal justification.6 Second, whereas 
Walls's comments on the nature of purgatory within a uniquely Protes­
tant theology are merely suggestive,7 I aim to be more precise in suggest­
ing two competing models of purgatory, only one of which Protestants 
should accept. Finally, since my project aims to speak to those Protestants 
for whom salvation is principally a matter of justification, the crux of my 
case turns on apparent difficulties generated by a standard view associ­
ated with this understanding of salvation to the effect that God makes uni­
lateral provision for our remaining sanctification at death. Though Walls's 
discussion reflects an awareness of the difficulties that are generated by 
this view, he neither makes it explicit nor employs it argumentatively, as 
I intend to do here. Thus, my own project, if successful, serves to rein­
force intuitions shared by Lewis and Walls that a doctrine of purgatory 
is a reasonable feature of a philosophically coherent and comprehensive 
Protestant theology.
§2. The Essential Moral Perfection of Heaven
According to traditional Christian belief, heaven is the dwelling place of 
God8—a place where nothing unholy abides. It is a state of existence that 
represents the telos of created human persons, the enjoyment of eternal 
union and fellowship with the triune God. Undoubtedly, such thinking is 
shaped in part by the poetry of John's apocalyptic vision.
And I heard a loud voice from the throne saying, "Behold, the dwell­
ing place of God is with man. He will dwell with them, and they 
will be his people, and God himself will be with them as their God. 
He will wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death shall be no 
more, neither shall there be mourning nor crying nor pain anymore, 
for the former things have passed away."9
At one level, such imagery suggests that heaven, in contrast to one's pres­
ent existence on earth, represents a state of existence in which there is 
neither pain nor suffering resulting from evil or sin. However, this sugges­
tion does not seem fully to capture standard Christian intuitions about the 
nature of heaven. For what distinguishes heaven from earth is not the mere 
absence of evil or sin; rather, in contrast to an earthly existence, a heavenly 
one will be one in which sin is no longer possible. Thus, perhaps it is more 
accurate to suggest that heaven is essentially morally perfect.
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The suggestion that heaven is essentially morally perfect does not, by 
itself, resolve the sense in which it is. Taken as a claim about bare logical 
or broadly metaphysical possibility, the assertion that evil or sin is not 
possible in heaven is subject to a familiar counterexample from traditional 
Christian belief. For according to some Christians, evil and sin actually 
arose in heaven when Satan and his cohorts rebelled against God. Thus, 
since the actual, albeit temporary, presence of evil or sin in heaven entails 
the logical possibility of evil or sin in heaven, heaven is not morally perfect 
in every possible world.
Whether the story of Satan's fall is credible is not important for present 
purposes.10 For even if it were true that evil and sin existed at one time in the 
presence of God, this would not entail the falsity of my claim about heav­
en's essential moral perfection. Two related reasons make this clear. First, 
one might accept the story of a Satanic fall while denying that Satan's fall 
constitutes the presence of evil or sin in heaven as such. In order to maintain 
such a position one need only think of heaven as an eschatological fulfill­
ment, a future hope. It is an unactualized state of being that God intends to 
bring about.11 Since Satan's fall preceded the fulfillment of this eschatologi­
cal hope, it does not constitute the presence of evil or sin in heaven as such. 
Thus, one might accept the story of a Satanic fall, while maintaining the 
view that heaven as such is essentially morally perfect. One difficulty with 
such a response is that it appears to sever the connection between heaven 
and the immediate presence of God. Given standard Christian beliefs about 
heaven, it is plausible to think that to be fully in God's immediate presence 
is to be in heaven. Thus, to the extent that a Satanic fall occurred in the im­
mediate presence of God, it occurred in heaven. To concede this point would 
entail that heaven is not essentially morally perfect in the logical or broadly 
metaphysical sense for reasons already described. However, it would not 
entail that subsequent to the expulsion of Satan and his followers, heaven is 
not (or will not be) essentially morally perfect in some other sense.
The sense in which heaven is essentially morally perfect is grounded 
in the natures of its occupants. God, the principal occupant of heaven, is 
holy. His nature is such that he cannot sin. Thus, heaven is morally perfect 
not because God merely happens not to sin, but because, given his nature, 
he is incapable of doing so. Similarly, I want to suggest that other denizens 
of heaven (e.g., angelic beings and human persons) contribute to its essen­
tial moral perfection by virtue of their possession of natures that render 
them incapable of sin as well. To be sure, the sense in which the human 
persons here imagined would be incapable of sin is not the same sense in 
which God is incapable of sin. Thus, I am not suggesting that by virtue of 
being incapable of sin, such human persons would, in effect, be God. On 
the contrary, the kind of moral perfection that such a human person would 
possess would be one befitting her nature as a human person (about which 
more below). At the same time, just as the essential moral perfection of 
heaven is grounded in the moral perfection that God possesses (in keep­
ing with his being God), so also the essential moral perfection of heaven 
is grounded in the moral perfection that its human occupants possess (in 
keeping with their being human).
If the essential moral perfection of heaven is grounded in the natures of 
its occupants, then the sense in which it is not possible that there be evil or
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sin in heaven is perhaps best construed as a kind of causal or nomologi- 
cal necessity. To claim that heaven is necessarily morally perfect is not to 
claim that heaven is perfect in every possible world. Rather, it is to claim 
that there is a law-like connection between the absence of sin and evil and 
the natures of heaven's inhabitants such that this connection would be 
maintained in a cluster of relevantly similar worlds. Thus, given standard 
Christian beliefs about heaven, even if it is logically possible that there be 
evil or sin in heaven, it remains plausible to think that heaven is (or will 
be) morally perfect as a matter of this sort of nomological necessity.
§3. Protestant Soteriology and the Dilemma of Sanctification
When this account of the essential moral perfection of heaven is placed in 
juxtaposition with standard Protestant beliefs about the nature of salva­
tion, it ultimately gives rise to a philosophical puzzle, one I call the di­
lemma o f sanctification. According to traditional Protestant theology, the 
possession of saving faith is a sufficient condition for enjoying eternal 
union and fellowship with God in heaven. Of course, the precise nature 
of saving faith itself and the manner in which it is effected are matters of 
intense dispute among Protestant theologians. Nevertheless, for present 
purposes, such disputes are largely, though not entirely, irrelevant.
For purposes of this particular argument, I do not make any specific 
assumptions about the manner in which saving faith is effected. Nonethe­
less, I do assume that to whatever extent the imputation of saving faith is 
a work of God, such divine agency cannot work so as to exclude any and 
all free human response whatsoever. Thus, I reject what might be thought 
of as a thoroughgoing determinism with respect to salvation. At the same 
time, I do not assume that the receipt of saving faith must be conceived of 
as such. In other words, it is possible for a person to obtain saving faith, 
despite the fact that she does not explicitly or consciously view herself 
as doing so. Thus, my assumption that the possession of saving faith is a 
sufficient condition for enjoying eternal union and fellowship with God 
in heaven accommodates Protestants with inclusivist, and perhaps even 
universalist, inclinations.
In keeping with standard Protestant beliefs, my argument does assume 
that the possession of saving faith is not strictly identical with the posses­
sion of a morally sanctified nature. Thus, while the possession of saving 
faith is a sufficient condition for enjoying eternal union and fellowship 
with God in heaven, the possession of saving faith does not, by itself, en­
tail that one, in fact, possesses a morally sanctified nature. Among those 
who possess saving faith, some might possess the morally sanctified na­
ture in question, while others might not. For ease of reference, I'll refer to 
persons in the former category as the Sanctified, and those in the latter as 
the Lapsable.
While familiar within Protestantism, the distinction between the 
Sanctified and the Lapsable as I intend to employ it here requires further 
philosophical clarification. As suggested above, what distinguishes the 
Sanctified from the Lapsable is that the former possess a certain kind of 
nature, character, or disposition that the latter do not. According to stan­
dard Protestant accounts, sanctification is the "process by which one's
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moral condition is brought into conformity with one's legal status before 
God."12 It is the process by which those who possess saving faith are 
made holy. Minimally, it would seem that the completion of this process 
produces a person free from sin, one who no longer commits sinful or 
evil acts. However, the fact that one no longer commits sinful or evil 
acts should not be accidental. Rather, it should be a consequence of the 
further fact that one who is sanctified has a different nature (i.e., a sancti­
fied nature). It is this sanctified nature that distinguishes those who no 
longer commit sinful acts because they are sanctified from those who no 
longer commit sinful acts merely because they are lucky. Thus, it seems 
plausible to suggest that the Sanctified possess a certain kind of settled 
virtuous disposition that the Lapsable lack. And it is the possession or lack 
of this settled virtuous disposition that properly distinguishes between 
the Sanctified and the Lapsable.
An initial gloss on the kind of settled virtuous disposition that I have in 
mind is rooted in possible relations between the will of a human person 
and the Divine will. Those who are sanctified are such that their own wills 
are fully and properly aligned with the Divine will. As a result, they are 
not capable of falling into sin. By contrast, those who are not sanctified 
are such that their own wills fail to be fully or properly aligned with the 
Divine will. Moreover, it is this fact about their wills that explains their be­
ing lapsable (i.e., capable of falling into sin). At the same time, to suggest, 
as I have, that the Sanctified are incapable of sin is not to suggest that it is 
logically or broadly metaphysically impossible for them to sin. Rather, it 
is to suggest that it is nomologically impossible for the Sanctified to sin. 
That is, there is a law-like connection between their failure to sin and their 
possession of the settled virtuous disposition that would be maintained in 
relevantly similar circumstances. Moreover, the possession of the settled 
virtuous disposition would support the following counterfactual. For any 
person x, if x were in circumstances C, x would not sin. In other words, it 
is the possession of the settled virtuous disposition in question that would 
make the foregoing counterfactual true. Here, it is important to note that C 
does not include all logically or broadly metaphysically possible circum­
stances. Thus, we might imagine certain bizarre possible circumstances in 
which x would sin without this counting against x's possession of the set­
tled virtuous disposition in question. This is because such bizarre possible 
circumstances are simply not relevant to whether x possesses the settled 
virtuous disposition in question. For example, we can easily imagine that 
x would sin under such counterfactual circumstances as those in which 
she found herself being tormented in hell or lacking the presence of the 
Holy Spirit. Yet x's sinning in such counterfactual circumstances would not 
count against her possession of the settled virtuous disposition in ques­
tion since they would not be relevant. What is relevant to whether x pos­
sesses the settled virtuous disposition in question are those circumstances 
that are appropriate to the nature of x . So, in the case of human persons, 
circumstances C will be restricted to those conditions under which human 
persons ought properly to be expected not to sin. Those who are sanctified 
then, are not merely those who don't sin. Rather, they are those who could 
not sin in the sense that they would not sin under circumstances in which 
they ought properly to be expected not to sin.
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In contrast, the Lapsable lack this settled virtuous disposition. Conse­
quently, if a person is lapsable, it is not true of her that if she were in cir­
cumstances in which she ought properly to be expected not to sin that she 
would not. To be sure, the falsity of the counterfactual in question does 
not entail that if she were in such circumstances, she would sin. What it 
does entail however, is that her failure to sin in such circumstances would 
not be nomologically grounded in the settled virtuous disposition I have 
described. And it is in this sense that, if she were to avoid sinning, her 
avoidance of sin might be as reasonably ascribed to luck or chance as to 
her character. Moreover, because she lacks the relevant settled virtuous 
character, it is true of her that it is nomologically possible for her to com­
mit sinful or evil acts.
As I have already suggested, when we situate my account of the es­
sential moral perfection of heaven in the context of standard Protestant 
beliefs about the nature of salvation, we encounter a conundrum I call the 
dilemma o f sanctification. My efforts to clarify the distinction between the 
Sanctified and the Lapsable serve to elucidate the dilemma. On the one hand, 
the essential moral perfection of heaven is such that it is not nomologically 
possible for sin or evil to be there. Since the Lapsable are persons for whom 
sinful or evil actions are a nomological possibility, no one in heaven is 
lapsable. On the other hand, standard Protestant theology is committed to 
the idea that while the possession of saving faith is a sufficient condition 
for eventually enjoying eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven, 
it is not, by itself, a sufficient condition for the possession of the settled 
virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified. So, given the reality 
that the vast majority of those who possess saving faith die as lapsable 
persons (i.e., who lack the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the 
Sanctified), it would seem that standard Protestant theology is committed 
to the presence of lapsable persons in heaven. Therefore, it would seem 
that either heaven is not essentially morally perfect or saving faith is not a 
sufficient condition for eternal union and fellowship with God.
§4. Solving the Dilemma of Sanctification: The Problem(s) with Provisionism
Despite its initial plausibility, the apparent tension created by the di­
lemma of sanctification is merely apparent. For while the essential moral 
perfection of heaven does entail that no one in heaven is lapsable, this 
does not entail that saving faith is not sufficient for eternal union and fel­
lowship with God. Interestingly, the essential moral perfection of heaven 
does entail that no one possessing saving faith attains or occupies heaven 
as someone who is lapsable. Thus, if heaven is essentially morally perfect 
in the sense that I have described, then everyone with saving faith must 
obtain the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified prior 
to attaining or occupying heaven. In short, being sanctified is a necessary 
condition for eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven.
By itself, the fact that one must be sanctified in order to enjoy eternal 
union and fellowship with God in heaven does not undermine the suf­
ficiency of saving faith. This is because one might be inclined to think (as 
is perhaps commonly assumed in Protestant theology) that the posses­
sion of saving faith at time t is sufficient for the possession of a morally
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sanctified nature at some later time t , where t is prior to one's entrance 
into heaven. Thus, the possession of saving faith remains a sufficient con­
dition for eventually enjoying eternal union and fellowship with God in 
heaven. However, when coupled with what might seem to many an obvi­
ous datum of the Christian life, Protestant theology seems committed to 
a troublesome position about how the sanctification of those who possess 
saving faith is accomplished.
Recall that according to traditional Protestant theology, the possession 
of saving faith is not strictly identical with the possession of a morally 
sanctified nature. That is, the possession of saving faith, while perhaps ul­
timately sufficient for the possession of a morally sanctified nature, is not 
initially (or by itself) sufficient for the possession of a morally sanctified 
nature. What is underscored by this claim is the nature of sanctification as 
a process, the completion of which results in the possession of the settled 
virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified. Yet many would read­
ily concede that for the overwhelming majority of those who possess sav­
ing faith, it is not a process that comes to completion during one's earthly 
life (i.e., before death). In light of this, many Protestants either explicitly or 
tacitly assume that for those who possess saving faith but die as lapsable 
persons, God will immediately and unilaterally supply the settled virtu­
ous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified. For example, Jerry Walls at­
tributes such a view to Jonathan Edwards. Edwards writes:
At death the believer not only gains a perfect and eternal deliverance 
from sin and temptation, but is adorned with a perfect and glorious 
holiness. The work of sanctification is then completed, and the beau­
tiful image of God has then its finishing strokes by the pencil of God, 
and begins to shine forth with a heavenly beauty like a seraphim.13
As Edwards's imagery suggests, God effectively fills in the gap between the 
lapsable nature with which the person possessing saving faith dies and the 
sanctified nature necessary to attain or occupy heaven. Moreover, God does 
this immediately and unilaterally for all persons who die possessing saving 
faith regardless of their relative level of lapsability. For ease of reference, I 
will call this view "provisionism" since God makes unilateral provisions 
for the Lapsable to become the Sanctified immediately upon their deaths.14
Although provisionism affords Protestant belief a way of maintaining 
the essential moral perfection of heaven and the sufficiency of saving faith 
(in light of the reality that more often than not the process of sanctification 
is not completed during this life), it does so in a way that strains credibil­
ity. As a way of motivating my case for purgatory, I will indicate in what 
follows why I find provisionism difficult to accept. Generally, my case 
against provisionism can be summarized as follows. First, there are rea­
sons related to continuity of personal identity for thinking that God could 
not unilaterally bring about the kind of transmutation to which provision- 
ism is committed. Second, even if we assume that God could unilaterally 
bring about such a transmutation at death, there seems to be no reason 
why God could not do it now. Thus, the fact that God does not do it now 
makes God appear morally culpable for the evil that is the result of those 
who possess saving faith but are lapsable.
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That God could not bring about the kind of unilateral transmutation 
suggested by provisionism is grounded in reasons having to do with con­
tinuity of personal identity. According to traditional Christian theism, a 
person who passes from this life into the next maintains at least some 
level of personal continuity. This is true even for views of human per- 
sonhood that reject the existence of disembodiable souls in favor of some 
materialist account of personal eschatology. For regardless of one's theory 
of personal eschatology, the assumption of traditional Christian theism 
is that the person who persists beyond death is, in some sense or other, 
continuous with the person who died. Minimally, such continuity seems 
to require the persistence of consciousness—an awareness of the self as 
a continuing, even if interrupted, subject of existence. But, it is precisely 
this minimum for continuity of personal identity that provisionism seems 
unable to accommodate.
A simple analogy is helpful here. There are cases in which medical 
patients with ordinarily curable conditions cannot be cured. This occurs 
most frequently in situations where the cure requires an operation, but 
the patient's general health is such that she could not survive the opera­
tion. Thus, while the condition itself is ordinarily curable by means of the 
operation in question, such a cure is not available to a patient who could 
not endure the operation. Quite simply, it would kill her. And her death in 
such circumstances would not constitute a cure; it would be her destruc­
tion. Similarly, it seems reasonable to imagine that God's instantaneous 
and unilateral transmutation of a lapsable individual into a sanctified one 
is an operation that simply could not be endured. It would result in the 
annihilation of the person in question. To be sure, God's power is such 
that he could bring some-one back into being after having annihilated 
some-one. However, it is unclear whether the one brought back into be­
ing would bear any continuity of consciousness with the one annihilated. 
After all, to suggest that one could not endure such a divine operation 
is to suggest that one's very "soul" or center of consciousness would be 
destroyed. Thus, whatever soul or center of consciousness God brought 
back into existence could not bear the relevant level of personal continuity 
with the one destroyed.
Of course, the analogy here proposed is not, in itself, an argument. 
It is merely suggestive of one. And while I believe that such an argu­
ment is not only available but also (once clearly articulated) compelling, 
I will not take the time to pursue it here.15 Rather, I will assume, for the 
sake of argument, that it is possible for continuity of personal identity 
to be preserved through the kind of divine operation presupposed by 
provisionism. Moreover, I will assume, as it seems provisionism does, 
that God can bring about the imagined unilateral transmutation with­
out thereby sacrificing any significant good. Once such assumptions are 
made, it appears that provisionism faces a new difficulty, one that can 
be summarized as follows. If God can make immediate and unilateral 
provisions for the Lapsable to become sanctified at death on the basis of 
their possession of saving faith without thereby sacrificing any signifi­
cant good, then there seems to be no reason why God could not do this 
now. Thus, the fact that God does not do this now makes God appear 
morally culpable for the evil in the world that is the result of the actions
PURGATORY AND THE DILEMMA OF SANCTIFICATION 319
of the Lapsable. In short, provisionism entails a new species of the eviden­
tial problem of evil.
One useful way of characterizing this difficulty employs a concept bor­
rowed from Alvin Plantinga. According to Plantinga, a perfectly good 
being eliminates as much evil as it can properly eliminate.16 To properly 
eliminate evil is to eliminate evil provided that doing so does not bring 
about a greater evil or eliminate an outweighing good. With this concept 
in hand, one might argue that God is not morally culpable for certain 
kinds of evil, a certain amount of evil, or for evil generally because such 
evil is not properly eliminable. For example, according to the now familiar 
"free will defense," it is logically impossible for God to create a world 
containing morally significant libertarian freedom while simultaneously 
guaranteeing the absence of evil. If the good of morally significant liber­
tarian freedom outweighs the evil that results from it, God cannot prop­
erly eliminate such evil. Thus, God would not be morally culpable for the 
evil that results from such morally significant libertarian freedom.
In the case of provisionism, however, such reasoning seems unavail­
able. Since by hypothesis God can properly eliminate the remaining ca­
pacity for evil in the Lapsable at death (i.e., God can do so without thereby 
sacrificing any outweighing good), there seems to be no reason why God 
cannot properly eliminate the remaining capacity for evil in the Lapsable 
now. And if there is no reason why God cannot properly eliminate the 
remaining capacity for evil in the Lapsable now, God's failure to do so 
impugns his perfect goodness. Thus, provisionism places God's perfect 
goodness in question by generating a type of evil that is properly elim- 
inable, which God fails to eliminate.
One immediate, but ultimately unsuccessful, response to this difficulty 
appeals directly to the free will defense. According to the proposed re­
sponse, God cannot now properly eliminate the remaining capacity for 
evil in the Lapsable since doing so would result in the loss of the outweigh­
ing good of morally significant libertarian freedom. Such a response how­
ever simply multiplies the difficulties for provisionism. If the good of 
morally significant libertarian freedom were such that its possession now 
(i.e., during one's earthly life) is more valuable than the guarantee of no 
evil, then the same would be true at some later time (e.g., during one's life 
in heaven). Thus, by appealing to free will as a way of avoiding the impli­
cation of the difficulty I have proposed, provisionism self-destructs. This 
is because the preservation of morally significant libertarian freedom in 
heaven would require God to refrain from providing for the sanctification 
of the Lapsable (i.e., making provisions for them to become beings who are 
no longer capable of sin). Moreover, such a move threatens the essential 
moral perfection of heaven, by raising what James Sennett has labeled the 
"dilemma of heavenly freedom."17
According to the standard free will defense, the existence of an om­
nipotent, omniscient, wholly good God is logically compatible with the 
existence of evil. This is because it is logically impossible for God to create 
a world containing morally significant libertarian freedom while simulta­
neously guaranteeing the absence of evil. Thus, the possibility of a world 
containing evil would be justified in light of the fact that such a possibility 
would be required to procure the significant good of morally significant
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libertarian freedom. However, as we have seen, the essential moral per­
fection of heaven requires the nomological impossibility of evil (or sin) in 
heaven. Thus, either human beings possess morally significant libertarian 
freedom in heaven, in which case heaven is not essentially morally perfect 
or human beings do not possess morally significant libertarian freedom in 
heaven, in which case the free will defense is in jeopardy.18
To solve this dilemma, Sennett proposes a sort of "compatibilist" concep­
tion of freedom he calls the Proximate Conception. A rough way of charac­
terizing the proximate conception of freedom is as follows:
For any morally significant action A, A is free only if either
(1) A itself is a libertarian free action, or
(2) A is determined by a causal history that includes some other libertar­
ian free action(s).19
Essentially, the proximate conception of freedom makes morally signifi­
cant libertarian freedom a metaphysically necessary condition for freedom 
generally. Thus, in order to procure the significant good of freedom in 
general, God had to create a world in which evil was possible at some time 
(i.e., a world containing morally significant libertarian freedom). Thus, the 
free will defense is preserved. However, in order to procure the significant 
good of freedom in general, God need not create a world in which evil is 
possible at all times (i.e., a world containing only morally significant liber­
tarian freedom). For according to the proximate conception of freedom, an 
action can be free even if it is determined, provided that it is determined 
by a past that includes at least some morally significant libertarian free ac­
tions. Thus, while human beings in heaven can enjoy the significant good 
of freedom, for which morally significant libertarian freedom is a neces­
sary condition, the freedom that human beings in heaven can enjoy poses 
no threat to its essential moral perfection since their actions can be deter­
mined by sanctified natures.
The details of Sennett's proposal need not detain us here. And although 
I lack the space to defend this assumption, I will presume for the sake of 
argument that Sennett's picture is largely correct.20 If it is, then at least one 
crucial point seems to emerge. What justifies the absence of morally sig­
nificant libertarian freedom in heaven is the fact that (a) the creatures who 
lack it in heaven possessed it at one time (i.e., on earth) and (b) the "com- 
patibilist" freedom possessed by these creatures in heaven is the result of 
a process (i.e., a causal history) that included morally significant libertar­
ian freedom. It is the necessity of this process that simultaneously makes 
Sennett's account plausible and ultimately renders provisionism unable to 
respond to the argument I have offered against it.
While Sennett himself is aware of this potential difficulty, he responds 
to it with what amounts to a promissory note. Sennett writes:
I have been asked repeatedly if my position entails a rather strin­
gent doctrine of salvation; viz., that only those who have lived long 
enough and worked hard enough to develop a character that fully 
determines actions for the good will be allowed into heaven. I do not 
believe that it does. There is room for some kind of doctrine of sancti­
fication, whereby God supplies upon our deaths whatever is lacking
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in our character formations to bring us to the state of compatibilist 
free perfection. I believe this can be worked out consistently by in­
sisting that it is the pattern we establish throughout a life of persis­
tent intentional character building that is critical—not our actually 
attaining the desired character itself in our lifetimes. By establishing 
such a pattern we are, in effect, giving God permission to fill in the 
gap. This is a highly complex matter, and one that must await a fully 
developed theological encounter with the Proximate Conception for 
complete explication. For the time being, however, I will claim only 
that it is not apparent to me that it cannot be made consistent with 
standard Christian views of salvation and sanctification.21
Although, as Sennett's remarks suggest, provisionism may succeed in a 
avoiding a doctrine of salvation by works, it does not succeed in avoiding 
the difficulty posed at the outset of this section. Specifically, if, immediate­
ly upon our deaths, God can unilaterally supply what is lacking to bring 
us into a state of compatibilist-free perfection on the basis of a pattern of 
character building that includes some morally significant libertarian free 
actions and decisions, and he can do so without thereby sacrificing any 
significant good, then there seems to be no reason why God cannot do so 
now. That is, there seems to be no reason why God cannot now unilater­
ally supply what is lacking to transform at least some of the Lapsable into 
persons who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the 
Sanctified. And, if there is no reason why God cannot do this now, then his 
failure to do so renders him morally culpable for the evil that is due to the 
actions of the Lapsable.
One might argue that the reason why God cannot now unilaterally sup­
ply what is lacking to transform at least some of the Lapsable into persons 
who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified 
is because the Lapsable in question have not yet established the crucial pat­
tern of "intentional character building." However, this response is not to 
the point. Either those that have not yet established the relevant pattern 
will do so during their earthly lives or they will not. If they will, then there 
is nothing that should prevent God from providing them with a sanctified 
nature once they have, in fact, established the relevant pattern—even if 
this entails providing a sanctified nature on earth. And as before, God's 
failure to avail himself of this option would make him morally culpable 
for the evil that is a result of actions on the part of those who had, in fact, 
established the relevant pattern, but had not been provided with a sancti­
fied nature. Alternatively, if those who have not yet established the rel­
evant pattern will not, in fact, ever do so in this life, then provisionism ren­
ders the pattern inessential. In other words, it entails a view of salvation 
and sanctification according to which establishing the relevant pattern of 
intentional character building is not ultimately a necessary condition for 
God to supply what is lacking in our sanctification at death. In effect, re­
gardless of how one lives, one will ultimately possess the settled virtuous 
disposition characteristic of the Sanctified on the basis of God's unilateral 
provision, provided that one possesses saving faith.
The upshot of the foregoing argument is this. Provisionism seems to 
make God morally culpable for the evil that is the due to the actions of the
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Lapsable. Moreover, this culpability cannot be overcome by claiming that 
it is possible that there is some significant good that would be sacrificed 
were God to unilaterally transmute members of the Lapsable into persons 
who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified. 
For according to the provisionist model, this is precisely what God will do 
upon the deaths of the Lapsable. Since provisionism entails that God's so 
doing apparently does not sacrifice any significant good, God's failure to 
exercise this option now seems to make him morally culpable for the evil 
that is due to the actions of the Lapsable. In short, God fails to eliminate evil 
that is properly eliminable.
Of course, the straightforward strategy in response to this difficulty 
is to propose some significant good that would be sacrificed if God were 
now to unilaterally transmute all of the Lapsable into persons who possess 
the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified. One pos­
sible suggestion is that if God were now to make unilateral provisions for 
all of the Lapsable to become such persons or to do so immediately upon 
their individual, respective acquisition of saving faith, this would result 
in the loss of divine hiddenness.22 The basic idea behind this proposal is as 
follows. God desires that human persons enter into fellowship with him. 
However, he desires that such a relationship be entered into on the basis 
of the free choices of human persons. Such choices must not be coerced. 
This requires that, at least to some extent, God remain hidden beyond 
the complete cognitive grasp human persons. For the full disclosure of 
God's goodness and love (i.e., of the Divine Self) would compel human 
response. Human persons would no longer be free to choose to love or 
to reject God because the full disclosure of the Divine Self would have 
a coercive effect on human response. In this scenario, God's unilateral 
transmutation of the Lapsable into the Sanctified immediately upon their in­
dividual, respective acquisition of saving faith is purportedly tantamount 
to the loss of divine hiddenness. Simply put, the instantaneous moral per­
fection of those who acquire saving faith would make it epistemically ob­
vious to those without it that God exists. Thus, the relevant level of divine 
hiddenness would be lost.
Despite its attractiveness, the appeal to the preservation of divine hid­
denness as a reason why God cannot now bring about the sanctification 
of the Lapsable is not entirely adequate as a defense of provisionism. First, 
one might make a prima facie case on biblical grounds that it is simply false 
that God's unilateral transmutation of the Lapsable into the Sanctified now 
would result in the loss of divine hiddenness. In a familiar parable from 
Luke's gospel, a rich man in Hades pleads with Abraham to send the beg­
gar Lazarus from Hades to his five living brothers to warn them of the tor­
ment he is experiencing there. The rich man intercedes, "if someone goes 
to them from the dead, they will repent." Abraham responds, "If they do 
not hear Moses and the Prophets, neither will they be convinced if some­
one should rise from the dead."23 As Abraham's reply to the rich man sug­
gests, it is possible and perhaps even likely that the spiritual blindness of 
some persons is such that not even verification of spiritual realities by the 
resurrected dead would make such realities epistemically obvious enough 
to compel belief. If this is true, then analogously, it is possible and perhaps 
even likely that the spiritual blindness of some persons is such that not
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even the instantaneous moral perfection of those who acquire saving faith 
would make it epistemically obvious to them that God exists.
But even if the instantaneous moral perfection of those who acquire 
saving faith did make it epistemically obvious to those without it that 
God exists, it does not follow that the relevant set of goods purportedly 
preserved by divine hiddenness would be lost. After all, the purpose of 
divine hiddenness is not to avoid coercing human persons into mere be­
lief in God's existence. Rather, it is to avoid coercion into the kind of full 
and loving relationship that God desires to have with human persons. 
And since mere belief in God's existence does not constitute the kind of 
full and loving relationship that God desires, even if the instantaneous 
moral perfection of those who acquire saving faith made mere belief in 
God's existence rationally compulsory, this would not, by itself, entail the 
loss of the goods that divine hiddenness purportedly guarantees. In or­
der to make the proposal based on divine hiddenness more plausible, one 
would need to show that if God were now to make unilateral provisions 
for all of the Lapsable to become sanctified or to do so immediately upon 
their individual, respective acquisition of saving faith, then this would 
not merely make belief in God's existence rationally compulsory, but also 
that it would coerce human persons into the kind of loving relationship 
that God desires. Since it is far from clear that the latter can be shown, the 
appeal to divine hiddenness as a reason why God cannot now unilaterally 
bring about the sanctification of the Lapsable does not seem plausible as a 
way of defending provisionism.
An alternative suggestion is that if God were now to make unilateral 
provisions for all of the Lapsable to become sanctified or to do so imme­
diately upon their individual, respective acquisition of saving faith, this 
would result in the loss of the good constituted by the process of sanc­
tification itself. According to this proposal, the process of sanctification, 
while involving God's cooperation, is itself a good significant enough to 
require that its termination or completion occur only as a result of its own 
internal momentum.24 If God were now to make unilateral provisions for 
all of the Lapsable to become sanctified or to do so immediately upon their 
individual, respective acquisition of saving faith, this would, in effect, cut 
the process of sanctification short or perhaps even prevent it from ever 
being initiated. Thus, God must let the process of sanctification run its 
course, so to speak.
This suggestion represents a crucial juncture in the argumentative 
dialectic against provisionism. For the proposal that the process of sanc­
tification is a good significant enough to require that its termination or 
completion occur only as a result of its own internal momentum together 
with provisionism, presupposes that death is the proper terminus for the 
process of sanctification. Apart from such an assumption, this proposal 
would be subject to a fairly obvious criticism. Specifically, if the process 
of sanctification itself is such that its termination or completion should 
occur only as a result of its own internal momentum, then this should 
remain true of the process of sanctification in someone who is lapsable 
whether it is with respect to this life or the next. In other words, if God's 
unilateral transmutation of the Lapsable into the Sanctified would sacrifice 
the significant good of the process of sanctification now (i.e., in this life),
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it seems equally plausible to think that the same good would be sacri­
ficed were God to perform the same action at one's death. Note however, 
that such a criticism fails on the assumption that death is the proper ter­
minus of the process of sanctification. That is, death is the point at which 
the process of sanctification comes to completion as a result of its own 
internal momentum.
Thus far, my argument against provisionism has presupposed that this 
is false. By contrast, my assumption has been that rather than represent­
ing a significant point in the process of sanctification at which God might 
be justified in penciling in the finishing strokes, death represents a point 
in the process of sanctification that is arbitrary. It is important to note that 
my assumption about the arbitrariness of death does not, by itself, beg 
the question against provisionism. This is because I allow that there is a 
reason that might justify God's unilateral action at some point in order 
to complete the process of sanctification.25 Nevertheless, my assumptions 
have been that the point in question cannot be an arbitrary one and that 
death is an arbitrary point in the process. To the extent that one is commit­
ted to the good of the process of sanctification itself, one seems committed 
to its internal integrity. Thus, I will not argue for the assumption that the 
point at which the process of sanctification comes to completion must not 
be arbitrary. However, in order to make my case against provisionism, 
more must be said about why death represents an arbitrary point in the 
process of sanctification.
The claim that death represents an arbitrary point in the process of 
sanctification is initially grounded in phenomenological or existential 
considerations. When we consider our experience of death as a whole, it 
is an aspect of our experience from which no pattern seems to emerge. We 
speak of lives "cut short." And we struggle to make sense of timing which 
often seems so untimely. To be sure, none of these considerations entail 
that there is no pattern behind what we experience as the chaotic disorder 
of death. Yet, our experience of death in this way is suggestive of my con­
tention that death is not the proper terminus of any process that possesses 
an internal momentum like the one that sanctification does. Death cuts 
such processes off at points during which they otherwise would not have 
come to completion on the basis of their own internal momentum. Death 
cuts against the nature of such processes; it interrupts them.
That death interrupts such processes becomes clearer in light of a rel­
evant disanalogy between biological life and the process of sanctification. 
The disanalogy explains why death might not always seem arbitrary when 
we are thinking about the former, whereas death does seem arbitrary 
when considering the latter. In the case of biological life, there is a sense 
in which death is its proper terminus. Living things die. The internal mo­
mentum of their biological processes are such that, if uninterrupted, they 
will terminate in death. Thus, with respect to biological life, death does 
not always seem arbitrary. Note that the same is not true of the process of 
sanctification. The internal momentum of the process of sanctification is 
not such that, if uninterrupted, it will terminate in death. To the contrary, 
if uninterrupted, the internal momentum of the process of sanctification is 
such that it will terminate in the possession of the settled virtuous disposi­
tion characteristic of the Sanctified. With respect to such a process, death
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seems an interruption. Thus, it does not seem to be a point in the process 
of sanctification at which God would be justified in making provisions for 
the Lapsable to become the Sanctified.
Let us take stock. To the extent that death does represent an arbitrary 
point in the process of sanctification, any reason that would justify God 
in making unilateral provisions for the Lapsable to become the Sanctified at 
death ought to justify God in making such provisions now. Moreover, any 
significant good that would be sacrificed by God's provision now, would 
seemingly be sacrificed by God's provision at one's death. If there is no sig­
nificant good that would be sacrificed by God's provision now, then God's 
failure to avail himself of the option of perfecting the Lapsable seemingly 
makes him morally culpable for the evil that results from their actions. 
Thus, provisionism succeeds as a solution to the dilemma of sanctification 
only at the expense of generating a species of the evidential problem of 
evil for which there seems no adequate response.
§5. Purgatory: Two Models
The discussion to this point discloses some important tensions in Protes­
tant theology, as well as a significant philosophical worry about the view 
I have called provisionism. Obviously, my argument does not show that 
provisionism is false. Rather, I have suggested that provisionism, as a so­
lution to the dilemma of sanctification, carries with it a significant philo­
sophical difficulty to which there does not appear to be an easy answer. 
The extent to which the problem that I have raised counts against provi- 
sionism generally is not a matter about which I will speculate at this point. 
Instead, I will simply suppose that while possibly true, provisionism does 
not enjoy a degree of epistemic obviousness that compels rational assent. 
That this is so should be clear from the considerations that I have raised 
against it. Consequently, I wish to consider the extent to which purgatory 
represents a viable alternative to the dilemma of sanctification.
The model of purgatory that I propose as a solution to the dilemma 
of sanctification aims not only to avoid the difficulties encountered in re­
lation to provisionism but also to alleviate Protestant worries about the 
prospect of rendering Christ's salvific work pointless. The model that 
I propose to defend stands in contrast to a traditional Roman Catholic 
model, one I call the Satisfaction Model of purgatory. According to the Sat­
isfaction Model, purgatory is a temporal state of existence after death the 
purpose of which is to make satisfaction (i.e., payment) for sins committed 
on earth for which sufficient satisfaction was not rendered by the time of 
death. It is this model that appears to have been affirmed at the Council of 
Florence in 1439.26 The council declared as follows:
Also, if truly penitent people die in the love of God before they have 
made satisfaction for acts and omissions by worthy fruits of repentance, 
their souls are cleansed after death by cleansing pains; and the suffrag­
es of the living faithful avail them in giving relief from such pains, that 
is, sacrifices of masses, prayers, almsgiving and other acts of devotion 
which have been customarily performed by some of the faithful for 
others of the faithful in accordance with the church's ordinances.27
It was this model of purgatory that incurred John Calvin's fury when he 
wrote in his Institutes of Christian Religion:
[W]hen the expiation of sins is sought elsewhere than in the blood 
of Christ, and satisfaction is transferred to others. . . . We are bound, 
therefore, to raise our voice to its highest pitch, and cry aloud that 
purgatory is a deadly device of Satan; that it makes void the cross of 
Christ; that it offers intolerable insult to the divine mercy; that it un­
dermines and overthrows our faith. For what is this purgatory but the 
satisfaction for sin paid after death by the souls of the dead? Hence 
when this idea of satisfaction is refuted, purgatory itself is forthwith 
completely overturned. But if it is perfectly clear, from what was 
lately said, that the blood of Christ is the only satisfaction, expiation, 
and cleansing for the sins of believers, what remains but to hold that 
purgatory is mere blasphemy, horrid blasphemy against Christ?28
With regard to the Satisfaction Model, Calvin's invective seems fitting from 
the perspective of Protestant theology. At the very least, the suggestion 
that additional satisfaction for sin must be made by sinners themselves in 
purgatory undermines the sufficiency of Christ's work as a satisfaction for 
sin. However, merely because the Satisfaction Model of purgatory renders 
Christ's work superfluous, it does not follow that no model of purgatory is 
compatible with the sufficiency of Christ's work as a satisfaction for sin.
The model of purgatory I propose to defend I call the Sanctification Mod­
el. According to this model, purgatory is a temporary state of existence 
after death for the Lapsable, the purpose of which is to complete the pro­
cess of sanctification in order to become persons who possess the settled 
virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified. The fundamental dif­
ference between the Sanctification Model and the Satisfaction Model hinges 
on purpose. Whereas the latter pertains to payment for earthly sins, the 
former does not. Rather, the Sanctification Model assumes the sufficiency of 
Christ's work as a satisfaction for sin. Thus, a person who is lapsable does 
not go to purgatory because she must make satisfaction for sins (for which 
sufficient satisfaction was not rendered during her earthly life); rather, 
she goes to purgatory in order for the process of sanctification to come 
to completion on the basis of its own internal momentum. In effect, the 
coming-to-completion of the process of sanctification after one's natural 
death is purgatory.
Alternatively, the difference between the Satisfaction and Sanctification 
models might be characterized in terms of what is being purged.29 On the 
Satisfaction Model, what gets purged through the purgatorial process is the 
penalty for sin or sin itself. By contrast, what gets purged in the Sanctifica­
tion Model is the disposition to sin. For Protestants, the possession of saving 
faith is sufficient for having sin or the penalty for sin "purged" by virtue 
of Christ's work as a satisfaction for sin. Yet, the disposition to sin remains 
until the process of sanctification is complete. In essence, the Sanctification 
Model of purgatory anticipates the completion of this process. It is forward 
looking in that its purpose is to provide an occasion for the fulfillment of 
a future aim. By contrast, the Satisfaction Model is backward-looking as its 
purpose is to provide an occasion for the remission of past failures.
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The Sanctification Model of purgatory has several important virtues. 
First, the Sanctification Model of purgatory solves the dilemma of sanctifi­
cation. This is because purgatory makes it possible for the Lapsable to be­
come persons who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic 
of the Sanctified before enjoying eternal union and fellowship with God in 
heaven. Thus, heaven preserves its essential moral perfection, while the 
possession of saving faith is maintained as a sufficient condition for even­
tual eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven. Second, in contrast 
to provisionism, the mechanism whereby the Lapsable become persons who 
possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified is 
not God's unilateral provision at death. Instead, it is a process that comes 
to completion as a result of its own internal momentum. So, the integrity 
of the process of sanctification itself is preserved. Moreover, the process 
of sanctification itself is arguably a good so significant that its internal 
integrity should not be compromised at an arbitrary point in the process. 
Thus, God is arguably not morally culpable for the evil that results from 
the actions of the Lapsable since his unilateral action at an arbitrary point 
in the process of sanctification would compromise the overriding value of 
the internal integrity of the process itself. Finally, the Sanctification Model 
of purgatory does not undermine the sufficiency of Christ's work as a sat­
isfaction for sin. This alleviates at least one standard objection that Protes­
tants might have against purgatory.
§6. Conclusion
I have argued that a certain understanding of the essential moral perfec­
tion of heaven coupled with a standard Protestant understanding of the 
nature of salvation and sanctification gives rise to an apparent philosophi­
cal dilemma, the dilemma of sanctification. I have further suggested that 
the tension created by the dilemma of sanctification can be alleviated by 
adopting either a provisionist or purgatorial understanding of the manner 
in which those who possess saving faith are ultimately perfected. At the 
same time, I have pointed out that provisionism has a price. Provision- 
ism appears to place God in the position of being morally culpable for 
a certain set of evils. Of course, appearances can be deceiving. Thus, the 
stalwart Protestant remains within her rational rights to believe that there 
is a reason that justifies God's unilateral provisions for sanctification at 
death that does not justify such provisions now. It is simply beyond our 
ken, a mystery. Still, given that the notion of purgatory would relive the 
epistemic pressures borne by provisionism, a doctrine of purgatory might 
prove useful to Protestant theology.
It perhaps goes without saying that my unadorned, abstract descrip­
tion of the Sanctification Model of purgatory raises many questions. For 
example, those whose conception of purgatory has been shaped by the 
medieval imagination of Dante might demand further detail about the 
nature of a purgatorial existence. No doubt, some of the questions raised 
by the view that I have proposed will prove vital in assessing not only 
the theological viability of a doctrine of purgatory but also its relative 
epistemic credibility. These questions must await further exploration. Yet, 
other questions raised by the view I have proposed will pass beyond the
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purview of philosophic investigation into realms best left to poetic imagi­
nation. And, in response to questions such as these, I close with the words 
of the philosopher-poet, C. S. Lewis:
My favourite image on this matter comes from the dentist's chair. I 
hope that when the tooth of life is drawn and I am "coming round," 
a voice will say, "Rinse your mouth out with this." This will be Pur­
gatory. The rinsing may take longer than I can now imagine. The 
taste of this may be more fiery and astringent than my present sensi­
bility could endure. But More and Fisher shall not persuade me that 
it will be disgusting and unhallowed.30
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